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Comments 
Give Them a Reason They Can 
Understand: An Examination of Rhode 
Island’s Medicaid Ineligibility Notices 
to the State’s Most Vulnerable 
Populations  
 
Laura Pickering* 
Unless a person is adequately informed of the reasons for 
denial of a legal interest, a hearing serves no purpose—
and resembles more a scene from Kafka than a constitu-
tional process.  Without notice of the specific reasons for 
denial, a claimant is reduced to guessing what evidence 
can or should be submitted in response and driven to re-
sponding to every possible argument against denial at the 
risk of missing the critical one altogether.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Adequate notice is at the heart of due process.2  It represents 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2017. 
 1.  Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 168–69 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 2.  Id.; see also Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E. 2d 825, 835 (Ind. 2012) 
(“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbi-
trary action by government.” (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 
(1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
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fundamental “fairness in administrative process” and provides 
critical safeguards to protect individuals against arbitrary action 
by the government.3  In the welfare context, though, “procedures 
often exist on paper . . . [and] are not pursued in practice.”4  Inad-
equate notice is particularly harmful to the elderly who, “as a 
group, are less able than the general populace to deal effectively 
with legal notices.”5  Without adequately detailed notice over why 
expected benefits are being denied, elderly Medicaid applicants 
unduly suffer fear, anxiety, and confusion.  Moreover, elderly 
Medicaid applicants wrongfully denied Medicaid benefits suffer 
staggering financial hardship.6  Individuals with progressively fa-
tal diseases that require institutional long-term care such as Alz-
heimer’s, Parkinson’s, and Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) 
rely on Medicaid to provide “essential, life-saving . . . care.”7  Cur-
rently, the average annual cost of long-term care in a Rhode Is-
land nursing home exceeds $100,000.8  The convergence of low-
income and high-cost medical needs compounds the potential dep-
rivation to elderly Medicaid applicants resulting from inadequate 
notice.9  The necessity for adequate notice, however, is not limited 
exclusively to the elderly.  Other vulnerable populations served by 
Medicaid, including low-income children, adults with disabilities, 
and children with special health care needs, are also at a distinct 
disadvantage in dealing with the government because of their age, 
 
 3.  Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerg-
ing Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1253 (1965). 
 4.  Id. at 1252. 
 5.  Gray Panthers, 652 F.2d at 169. 
 6.  See Genworth 2015 Cost of Care Survey Rhode Island State-
SpecificData, https://www.genworth.com/dam/Americas/US/PDFs /Consumer/ 
corporaten/cost-of-care /118928RI_040115_gnw.pdf.  In 2015, the national 
median annual rate for long-term care in a nursing home was $80,300 for a 
semi-private room and $91,250 for a private room.  In 2015, the Rhode Island 
median annual rate was $93,075 for a semi-private room and $103,113 for a 
private room. 
 7.  See STATE OF R.I., INITIAL REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP TO 
REINVENT MEDICAID: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION IN 
THE FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET 4 (2015),  http://www.eohhs.ri.gov/Portals/ 
0/Uploads/Documents/ReinventMedicaid/Report_WorkingGrouptoReinventM
edicaid.pdf.   
 8.  See 41-040-002 R.I. CODE R. § 0384.20 (“Currently, the average 
monthly cost for private payment in a nursing facility is $9,113.”); see also 
supra note 6.  
 9.  See Gray Panthers, 652 F.2d at 166. 
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disability, and socioeconomic status.10 
To investigate the adequacy of Rhode Island’s Medicaid ineli-
gibility notices, I submitted a Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) request with the Rhode Island Department of Human 
Services (“DHS”) for copies of the actual notices it sends to Medi-
caid applicants.11  DHS’s response to my request included samples 
of actual notice content and what it calls “tokens”—the template 
language used by DHS employees to draft notices.12  The majority 
of the samples and tokens I reviewed revealed a recurring pattern 
of insufficient notices that fail to adequately notify Medicaid ap-
plicants of the reasons for their Medicaid ineligibility. 
This Comment argues that particular categories of DHS’s in-
eligibility notices violate constitutional requirements for due pro-
cess.  Part I provides a brief background of the Rhode Island Med-
icaid program including its structure, eligibility requirements, and 
application and notification procedures.  Part II explains the fed-
eral and state constitutional requirements for due process, includ-
ing what constitutes adequate notice and the test for determining 
the level of process due.  Part III analyzes the legal insufficiency 
of Rhode Island’s Medicaid ineligibility notices.  By using notices 
from the FOIA sample, this Comment demonstrates how particu-
lar ineligibility notices violate the due process requirements.  The 
actual content of the notice demonstrates the confusion applicants 
experience and the practical need for reform.  Finally, Part IV 
provides brief closing remarks, including a call to action for DHS 
to fix its inadequate ineligibility notices for the benefit of both pri-
vate and public interests.  Rhode Island Medicaid applicants de-
 
 10.  See Ford v. Shalala, 87 F. Supp. 2d 163, 176–77 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (not-
ing that Supplemental Social Security Income (SSI) claimants’ status as poor, 
aged, blind, and/or disabled puts them “in a profoundly inferior position in 
relationship to a government bureaucracy”). 
 11.  Information is on file with the Roger Williams University Law Re-
view. 
 12.  Id.  DHS’s legacy “InRhodes” computer system, which generates the 
agency’s notices, does not have the capacity to store previously sent notices.  
As an alternative, DHS provided select content from actual notices and the 
“tokens” it uses to create its long-term care related notices.  Tokens are tem-
plates that DHS merges with other data in its InRhodes system to produce its 
final notice.  The tokens do not constitute the entire notice.  See also 
Jennifer Bogdan, Using Old Computer System to Cost R.I. Dept. of Human 
Services $4M, PROVIDENCE J. (May 7, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.providence 
journal.com/article/20150507/NEWS/150509474. 
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serve simplified, streamlined, and fair notice of their Medicaid in-
eligibility. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF RHODE ISLAND’S MEDICAID PROGRAM 
Created in 1965, Medicaid is a joint federal-state spending 
program codified in Title XIX of the Social Security Act.13  Medi-
caid is a means-tested program designed to provide health cover-
age to individuals with low-income and special health care 
needs.14  Each state administers its own Medicaid program within 
certain parameters established by the federal government.15  The 
states’ administrative autonomy results in substantial variations 
in Medicaid eligibility policy from state to state.16 
In Rhode Island, the Executive Office of Health and Human 
Services (“EOHHS”) administers the Medicaid program, and the 
Rhode Island Department of Human Services (“DHS”) determines 
Medicaid eligibility.17  To qualify, applicants must satisfy citizen-
ship, residency, and strict financial requirements.18  Eligibility, 
however, is limited to individuals with specified characteristics.  
In Rhode Island, eligible coverage groups include low-income chil-
dren, adults with disabilities, elders, and children with special 
health care needs.19 Additionally, applicants are required to com-
 
 13.  Jon Donenberg, Medicaid and Beneficiary Enforcement: Maintaining 
State Compliance with Federal Availability Requirements, 117 YALE L. J. 
1498, 1500 (2008); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-8-1–
32 (Supp. 2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-7.2-2(a)(6) (Supp. 2015) (“[DHS shall] 
[a]dminister Rhode Island Medicaid in the capacity of the single state agency 
authorized under Title XIX of the U.S. Social Security [A]ct . . . and exercise 
such single state agency authority for such other federal and state programs 
as may be designated by the governor. Except as provided for herein, nothing 
in this chapter shall be construed as transferring to the secretary the powers, 
duties or functions conferred upon the departments by Rhode Island general 
laws for the management and operations of programs or services approved for 
federal financial participation under the authority of the Medicaid state 
agency.”).  
 14.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8-3; see also 41-040-002 R.I. CODE R. § 
0300.01(B) (LexisNexis 2014). 
 15.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-7.2-2(a)(6).  
 16.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-7.2-2(a)(6). 
 17.  41-040-002 R.I. CODE R. § 0300.01(C)(2). 
 18.  R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-8-1, 40-8-3; see also 41-040-002 R.I. CODE R. § 
0300.01(B)(1). 
 19.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8-3; see also 41-040-002 R.I. CODE R. § 
0300.01(B)(1). 
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plete a burdensome and time-consuming application process.20  
DHS must provide each applicant with written notice of its eligi-
bility determination.21  If an applicant is ineligible, DHS must 
provide the “reasons for the action” and the “specific regulation 
supporting the action.”22  An applicant has thirty days to appeal 
DHS’s ineligibility determination.23 
As discussed in more depth in Part II, the legal requirements 
governing Medicaid ineligibility notices are apparent.  As the 
FOIA request revealed, though, DHS’s ineligibility notices do not 
always comply with these legal requirements.24  DHS’s failure, in 
some cases, to provide constitutionally adequate notice to Rhode 
Island Medicaid applicants is problematic because it markedly in-
creases the risk that applicants who otherwise meet all of the oth-
er eligibility requirements will be erroneously denied benefits.  
Adequate notice protects Medicaid applicants—some of Rhode Is-
land’s most vulnerable residents—from mistakes and arbitrary 
agency action. 
II.  THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RHODE ISLAND’S MEDICAID 
INELIGIBILITY NOTICES 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution require procedural due process.25  Rhode Island has 
incorporated sufficiently similar due process requirements into its 
state constitution.26  Generally, procedural due process requires 
the government to follow certain procedures before it may legally 
deny a person of life, liberty, or property.27  The following Sections 
will explore the relevant judicial interpretations of procedural due 
 
 20.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8-6; see also R.I. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., 
APPLICATION FOR ASSISTANCE (rev. Jan. 2016), http://www.dhs.ri.gov/ apply-
now/DHS-2%20Application%20for%20Assistance%20Rev%2001-16.pdf. 
 21.  42 C.F.R. § 435.913 (2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8-6.  
 22.  42 C.F.R. § 435.913; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8-6 (“[N]otice to the 
applicant shall set forth therein the reason therefor”). 
 23.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8-7. 
 24.  See infra Part II. 
 25.  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 26.  See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. (“No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law . . . .”). 
 27.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
569 (5th ed. 2015) (“Classic procedural due process issues concern what kind 
of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it 
takes a particular action.”). 
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process as it pertains to adequate notice and the right to govern-
ment benefits. 
A. Goldberg v. Kelly: Welfare Benefits Are Subject to Procedural 
Due Process Requirements 
Procedural due process applies in the context of government 
benefits because Medicaid applicants have a property interest in 
the legitimate expectation of receipt of benefits “rooted in state . . . 
[and] federal law.”28  Prior to 1970, though, procedural due pro-
cess only applied when an interest was a right, not a privilege.29  
By the 1960s, legal scholars, particularly Yale Law Professor 
Charles Reich, increasingly criticized this traditional “rights-
privilege” distinction.30  Reich argued that government benefits 
such as welfare, education, and Social Security were a form of 
property rather than “charity” or “gratuity” and that the rights-
privilege distinction was an anachronism.31  In 1970, in the land-
mark case of Goldberg v. Kelly,32 the United States Supreme 
Court discarded the traditional “rights-privilege distinction” and 
adopted Reich’s so-called “new property” theory.33  This ruling 
opened the door for the constitutional protections applicants and 
recipients of government benefits receive today. 
In Goldberg, the Court held that welfare benefits were a 
“matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive 
 
 28.  Ford v. Shalala, 87 F. Supp. 2d 163, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see 42 
U.S.C. § 1396 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8-7; see also Hamby v. Neel, 368 
F.3d 549, 559 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that plaintiffs had a property interest 
in Medicaid coverage “for which they hope[d] to qualify” because “Medicaid is 
a program established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act”); Perdue v. 
Gargano, 964 N.E. 2d 825, 832 (Ind. 2012)  (“[E]ntitlement benefits are ‘prop-
erty’ entitled to the full panoply of due process protections”).  
 29.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 583. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  397 U.S. 254 (1970).  The Goldberg case involved a class action ap-
peal by New York City residents receiving welfare benefits under the joint 
federal and state program Aid to Families with Dependent Children.  Id. at 
255–56.  The plaintiff class appealed New York state’s termination of their 
welfare benefits without any hearing on the basis that such pre-hearing ter-
mination violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
the Supreme Court agreed, establishing the modern view of property as an 
“entitlement.”  Id. at 260–61.  See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 583.  
 33.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 
583.  
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them” and that the “constitutional restraints” of due process must 
be extended to welfare recipients prior to the termination of bene-
fits.34  The Court refined the contours of its “new property” doc-
trine in Board of Regents v. Roth.35  In Roth, the Court discussed 
two factors required to create a constitutionally protected property 
interest in a government benefit program: 
First, the benefit claimant must have a legitimate enti-
tlement to the benefit rooted in state or federal law.  In 
addition, the claimant must ‘presently enjoy’ that enti-
tlement as opposed to expecting to receive it at some un-
defined time in the future.36 
Since Goldberg, courts have found that entitlement applicants and 
recipients have legitimate property interests in government bene-
fits, including, but not limited to, Social Security disability bene-
fits,37 food stamp benefits,38 public housing assistance,39 and 
Medicaid benefits.40 
Establishing that procedural due process applies to Medicaid 
applicants, the next question is what constitutes adequate notice.  
The Supreme Court’s standard for constitutionally adequate no-
tice, set forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., is that no-
tice must be “reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections.”41  Goldberg fur-
ther clarified this standard for adequate notice requiring that no-
tice “must be ‘reasonably certain’ to ‘actually inform’ the party, 
and in choosing the means, one must take account of the ‘capaci-
ties and circumstances’ of the parties to whom the notice is ad-
dressed.”42  Additionally, notice must be “timely” and “detail[] the 
 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  See 408 U.S. 564, 577–78 (1972). 
 36.  Ford v. Shalala, 87 F. Supp. 2d 163, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing 
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). 
 37.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
 38.  Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985). 
 39.  Nozzi v. Hous. Auth., 806 F.3d 1178, 1187 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 40.  Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 556–57 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 41.  Id. at 560 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 314 (1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 42.  Nozzi, 806 F.3d at 1194 (citations omitted) (first quoting Mullane, 
339 U.S. at 314; then quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970)). 
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[proposed] reasons for [the] termination.”43  “These constitutional 
mandates have been embodied in the federal and state regulations 
governing administration of the Medicaid program. . . .”44  As 
such, the analysis for whether DHS’s ineligibility notices violate 
statutory and regulatory requirements is substantially similar to 
the due process analysis. 
B.  Mathews v. Eldridge: The Procedural Due Process Evaluative 
Rubric 
To determine “whether the administrative procedures provid-
ed . . . are constitutionally sufficient,” courts routinely apply the 
balancing test the Supreme Court set forth in Mathews v. El-
dridge: 
[T]he specific dictates of due process generally require[] 
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.45 
Essentially, the Mathews test is a cost-benefit analysis of the pri-
 
 43.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267–68. 
 44.  Baker v. Alaska Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 191 P.3d 1005, 1009 
(Alaska 2008).  See 42 C.F.R. § 431.205(d) (2015) (“The hearing system must 
meet the due process standards set forth in [Goldberg] . . . .”); 42 C.F.R. § 
435.913 (2015) (“The agency must send each applicant a written notice of the 
agency’s decision on his application, and, if eligibility is denied, the reasons 
for the action, the specific regulation supporting the action, and an explana-
tion of his right to request a hearing.”). Rhode Island’s statutory and regula-
tory framework governing Medicaid notices essentially mirrors federal law.  
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8-6 (2006) (requiring notice of ineligibility to appli-
cants “set forth therein the reason therefor”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-9(b)(4)  
(requiring notice in a contested case shall include “[a] short and plain state-
ment of the matters inserted”); 41-040-002 R.I. CODE R. § 0300.02(D) (Lex-
isNexis 2014) (“Written notice is provided to each applicant stating the Medi-
caid agency’s eligibility decision, the basis for the decision, and an applicant’s 
right to appeal and request a hearing.”).  
 45.  424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263–71).  
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vate and governmental interests at stake.46 
In Mathews, the Court ruled “that an evidentiary hearing 
[was] not required prior to the termination of [the plaintiff’s Social 
Security] disability benefits” because the degree of potential dep-
rivation to the plaintiff was limited.47  Unlike the potential depri-
vation “of the very means by which to live” attributed to the plain-
tiff-welfare recipients in Goldberg, the Mathews Court noted 
eligibility for disability benefits was not contingent upon financial 
need.48  Therefore, even if the plaintiff’s benefits at issue in 
Mathews were terminated prior to a hearing, the plaintiff may 
have had access to other unaffected financial resources in order to 
sustain himself pending appeal.49  The Mathews Court found that 
the additional administrative and fiscal burden to the Social Secu-
rity Administration—providing a pretermination hearing—was 
not warranted, as the existing administrative procedures ade-
quately safeguarded against any potential deprivation.  Mathews 
provides a clear, flexible analytic framework for procedural due 
process analysis. 
 
 46.  Stephanie E. Roark, When the System Fails: What Notification Sys-
tem Does Due Process Require in the Context of State Aid to the Elderly?, 12 
ELDER L.J. 149, 162 (2004) (“The Mathews test is essentially a cost/benefit 
analysis: ‘[a]t some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the indi-
vidual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of in-
creased insurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost.’” (al-
teration in the original) (quoting at Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348)). 
 47.  424 U.S. at 349. 
 48.  Matthews, 424 U.S. at 340; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.  In his dissent, 
Justice Brennan noted that after the plaintiff’s “disability benefits were ter-
minated there was a foreclosure upon the [plaintiff’s] home and the family’s 
furniture was repossessed, forcing [the plaintiff], his wife, and their children 
to sleep in one bed.”  Mathews, 424 U.S.  at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 49.  See id. at 342 (majority opinion) (“[T]he disabled worker’s need is 
likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility 
of access to private resources, other forms of government assistance will be-
come available where the termination of disability benefits places a worker or 
his family below the subsistence level”); cf. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 
(“[T]ermination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may 
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he 
waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immedi-
ately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily 
subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the wel-
fare bureaucracy.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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C.  Avanzo v. R.I Dep’t of Human Services: Rhode Island’s 
Standard for Adequate Notice in the Government Benefit Context 
Rhode Island’s requirements for adequate notice in the gov-
ernment benefits’ context are set forth in Avanzo v. R.I. Depart-
ment of Human Services.50  In Avanzo, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court considered DHS’s use of preprinted standardized forms in 
order to notify a class of plaintiff-welfare recipients of the termi-
nation of their benefits.51 The court held that DHS deprived the 
plaintiffs of due process of the law, because, inter alia, the pre-
printed standardized forms did not inform the plaintiffs of the in-
dividualized reasons for the termination of their benefits. 52The 
court affirmed the following Superior Court conclusion that: 
[T]he termination notices [DHS] issued . . . are inade-
quate in failing to provide the class members with indi-
vidualized reasons for the agency determination.  The no-
tices provided only broad, conclusory language, and fail to 
apprise the recipients of the specific grounds for the 
agency’s determination.  As a result[,] class members 
cannot determine in what respect their case was found 
wanting.  Due process requires individualized notice, so 
that recipients can be apprised of the reasons their bene-
fits are being denied or terminated.53 
The court decided, “notices containing only general conclusory 
language without specific relevance to the recipients’ individual 
cases [will] not suffice.”54  The meaningful opportunity to be 
heard, required by Goldberg, the court noted, would have required 
DHS to notify the plaintiffs of the new changes in standards for 
eligibility and provide an explanation of how the plaintiffs failed 
to meet these new standards.55  Since 1993, DHS has maintained 
a consistent record of violating the legal requirements for notic-
 
 50.  625 A.2d 208 (R.I. 1993). 
 51.  Id. at 210. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 209–10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54.  Id. at 211 (citing Dilda v. Quern, 612 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 447 U.S. 935 (1980); Ortiz v. Eichler, 616 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Del. 
1985), aff’d, 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 55.  Id. at 210–11 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970)). 
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es.56  Examples of specific violations include notice that fails to 
give any reason for an adverse action and notice that does not cite 
any regulation in support of an adverse action.57 There is no una-
nimity among Rhode Island courts as to what constitutes individ-
ualized notice. 
In sum, adequate notice is “reasonably calculated” to “actually 
inform” a Medicaid applicant of the reasons for DHS’s adverse de-
termination of eligibility.58  The notice must “detail[] the [pro-
posed] reasons” for the adverse determination.59  Furthermore, it 
must be individualized, meaning that the notice relates DHS’s 
reasons for ineligibility to the specific facts of the applicant’s par-
ticular case.60 
III.  THE LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY OF RHODE ISLAND’S PROBLEMATIC 
MEDICAID INELIGIBILITY NOTICES 
Having explored the various judicial interpretations of notice 
requirements, this Part analyzes DHS’s ineligibility notices by ap-
plying the Mathews framework to test the legal sufficiency of ac-
tual notice content sent to Rhode Island Medicaid applicants.61  
Specifically, it analyzes three broad categories of problematic no-
tice: (1) notices that are conclusory; (2) notices with financial cal-
culations but no itemizations; and (3) notices that are incompre-
 
 56.  See Dominguez v. R.I. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2002 WL 475355, at *2 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2002) (“This is not the first time a DHS Letter of 
Denial has been contested on due process grounds.”); see also Borgueta v. R.I. 
Dep’t of Human Servs., 2013 WL 1943163, at *9 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 2, 2013) 
(“DHS failed to cite any regulations supporting its reason for denying [appli-
cant’s] application in the second notice . . . .”); Armstrong v. R.I. Dep’t of Hu-
man Servs., 1996 WL 936917, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 1996) (“Both the 
caselaw and statutory framework demonstrate that DHS’s notice was in vio-
lation of such statutory provisions.”); Flynn v. R.I. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
1995 WL 941389, at *7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 1995) (“The Court has re-
viewed the record and agrees with this contention, but need not dwell on it as 
it has ruled that the notices were inadequate, thereby nullifying the subse-
quent proceedings.”). 
 57.  See Borgueta, 2013 WL 1943163, at *9; Flynn, 1995 WL 941389, at 
*7. 
 58.  See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315, 318 
(1950). 
 59.  See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267–68. 
 60.  See Avanzo, 625 A.2d at 210. 
 61.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
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hensible to the average Medicaid applicant.62  These categories of 
deficiency are not mutually exclusive.  Underlying all three cate-
gories is a lack of sufficient information, which prevents appli-
cants from determining whether there is a meaningful basis to 
contest their Medicaid ineligibility.  Applying Mathews in this 
context demonstrates the constitutional inadequacies of each cat-
egory of notice; how each category of notice increases the risk of 
erroneous deprivation to Medicaid applicants; and the negligible 
burden on DHS to provide improved ineligibility notices. 
A.  The Private Interest at Stake 
The private interest at stake involves the “degree of depriva-
tion” to Rhode Island Medicaid applicants from DHS’s inadequate 
notices.63  Medicaid provides an essential “safety net” of vital med-
ical care to Rhode Island’s most vulnerable residents who, in addi-
tion to being poor, are aged, blind, or disabled.64  Without Medi-
caid coverage, eligible applicants may be “condemned to suffer 
grievous loss . . . .”65  As the Court noted in Goldberg: 
For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to 
obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.  
Thus the crucial factor . . . is that termination of aid 
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may 
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which 
to live while he waits.66 
Similar to the severe potential deprivation to welfare recipi-
ents described in Goldberg, there is a considerable degree of po-
tential deprivation to otherwise eligible Medicaid applicants who 
are erroneously denied Medicaid benefits.  Applicants with com-
plex medical needs such as the elderly face substantial financial 
loss from an ineligibility determination—nursing home care in 
Rhode Island can exceed $100,000 annually.  Moreover, an appli-
 
 62.  Please note this Comment stratified the sample notices into three 
broad categories of problematic notices for analytic purposes.  None of the 
categories are mutually exclusive and, thus, may overlap. 
 63. Ford v. Shalala, 87 F. Supp. 2d 163, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 64.  Id. at 167. 
 65.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (quoting Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66.  Id. at 264 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
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cant’s fear and anxiety over how to obtain critical medical cover-
age can have a significant emotional impact on not just an appli-
cant, but her entire family as well.  Due to age, disability, and so-
cioeconomic status, Medicaid applicants are already “in a 
profoundly inferior position in relationship to a government bu-
reaucracy.”67 Therefore, the interest of Rhode Island Medicaid ap-
plicants is “substantial enough . . . to warrant” improved notice.68 
B.  The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
Having established the requisite private interest, the analysis 
turns to the risk of erroneous deprivation to Rhode Island Medi-
caid applicants.  The risk of erroneous deprivation involves an 
evaluation of the “fairness and reliability” of existing administra-
tive procedures and the probable value of any additional proce-
dural safeguards.69  The administrative procedure at issue is the 
adequacy of DHS’s ineligibility notices.  Constitutionally adequate 
notice is “reasonably calculated to actually inform” applicants.70  
As the forthcoming FOIA examples will reveal, each category of 
problematic notice markedly increases the risk eligible Medicaid 
applicants will be erroneously denied benefits because the notices 
do not contain enough information for applicants to determine 
whether they have a meaningful basis to contest DHS’s ineligibil-
ity determination.  As such, this Section demonstrates the need 
for improved notices. 
1.  Conclusory Notices 
Many of DHS’s sample notices and tokens are inadequate be-
cause the notices do not actually inform applicants of the underly-
ing reasons for DHS’s ineligibility determination.  Consider the 
following excerpt from an ineligibility notice sent to an actual 
Rhode Island Medicaid applicant: 
[You] are not eligible for RI Medical Assistance [because] 
you did not provide required proof of your situation.  Spe-
 
 67.  Willis v. Lascaris, 499 F. Supp. 749, 756 (N.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 68.  Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 69.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976). 
 70.  Nozzi v. Hous. Auth., 806 F.3d 1178, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis 
added); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
314 (1950)).  
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cifically you did not provide: sufficient verification about 
a bank account (RI DHS Manual, Section 0300.25.20. 
[You did not provide] verification of income (RI DHS 
Manual, Section 0300.25.20).  [You are ineligible] due to 
failure of verification. 
This notice is conclusory because it lacks essential details; it does 
not specifically identify the subject or time period for which the in-
formation is requested nor does it explain what constitutes suffi-
cient verification. 
Notice must specifically identify the information requested.  
In Henry v. Gross, the Second Circuit held that a notice of termi-
nation to a welfare recipient was inadequate when it stated the 
defendant-city’s reason for termination was “a bank account which 
contain[ed] in excess of $1,000.”71  The notice did not include the 
“name of the bank, the account number, or any information indi-
cating whether the account [was] individually or jointly held . . . , 
[e]ven when the city actually possesse[d] the more specific infor-
mation.”72  Because of the notice’s lack of detail, the plaintiff was 
not able to determine what bank account disqualified her until her 
hearing.73  The court found that for the notice to meet minimum 
constitutional standards of adequacy the defendant must add a 
statement advising recipients that “upon request, defendants will 
provide [the] . . . recipient the number of the bank account, the 
bank branch . . . , the account balance, and, if available, the full 
title of the account.”74 
In Rhode Island, compliance with Goldberg and Avanzo re-
quires that DHS notify an ineligible applicant how she specifically 
failed to meet Medicaid eligibility standards.  Broad-based conclu-
sory statements such as “you are not eligible . . . [because] you did 
not provide required proof of your situation” or “verification about 
a bank account” lack sufficient detail to meet this standard.  While 
the above sample provides “some information to [an applicant] . . . 
in brief and general terms . . . these are merely the ‘ultimate rea-
sons’ for the denial [and] . . . fail to provide any explanation of how 
 
 71.  803 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 765.  The court also found that the defendant must add a 
statement explaining the implications of joint bank account ownership on eli-
gibility for welfare.  Id. 
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this ‘ultimate reason’ was reached.”75  Thus, the applicant cannot 
determine whether she has a meaningful basis to contest the deci-
sion.76  “At a minimum, due process requires the agency to ex-
plain, in terms comprehensible to the [applicant], exactly what the 
agency proposes to do and why the agency is taking this action.”77  
Detailed notice in adverse actions is a necessary protection 
against arbitrary agency decisions.  Without sufficiently detailed 
notice, “only the aggressive receive their due process right to be 
advised of the reasons for the proposed action.  The meek and 
submissive remain in the dark and suffer their benefits to be re-
duced or terminated without knowing why the Department is tak-
ing that action.”78 
Notice that does not “adequately inform” an applicant what 
the relevant eligibility standard is, and how she failed to meet it, 
puts an applicant at a “distinct disadvantage” at a hearing.  In 
Flynn v. R.I. Department of Human Services, the court held that 
DHS’s notice of termination to a welfare recipient was inadequate 
when it stated that she was no longer eligible for benefits because 
there was no evidence of her “total and permanent disability.”79  
The court noted that this explanation was tautology—equivalent 
to “a declaration stating ‘you are being denied benefits because 
you are ineligible to receive them.’”80  Although the notice also 
contained a citation to a regulation and an invitation to request a 
copy of it from the DHS office, the court found that “mere citation 
 
 75.  Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 835 (Ind. 2012). 
 76.  See, e.g., Avanzo v. R.I. Dep’t of Human Servs., 625 A.2d 208, 208 
(R.I. 1993); Perdue, 964 N.E.2d at 832 (agreeing with plaintiff-welfare recipi-
ents that “due process requires ‘notice specifying which specific document or 
documents [an applicant] is alleged to have failed to provide’ so that individ-
uals can make informed decisions about whether to appeal an adverse deter-
mination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 77.  Perdue, 964 N.E.2d at 836 (quoting Ortiz v. Eichler, 616 F. Supp. 
1046, 1061–62 (D. Del. 1985), aff’d, 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).  In Ortiz, the court held that notice to public assis-
tance applicants providing only “a one sentence explanation for the agency’s 
action, such as ‘children’s wages exceed eligibility limit,’ or ‘you are over the 
gross income eligibility limit,’ or ‘you did not provide a protective payee as re-
quested’” were constitutionally inadequate because the notices did not suffi-
ciently explain the reasons underlying the agency’s decision.  Ortiz, 616 F. 
Supp. At 1061.  
 78.  Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1974). 
 79.  1995 WL 941389, at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 1995).  
 80.  Id. at *8. 
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to the standards without any reference as to how the standards 
relate to an applicant’s specific medical condition” does not advise 
an applicant of how she failed to meet eligibility requirements.81  
Further, the court determined that “due process require[d] that 
the entire Notice be contained within the document purporting to 
contain it without some additional and supplementary act re-
quired on the part of the recipient to locate the regulations and 
then apply them to her own case.”82 
Thus, it appears that Flynn established that, in addition to 
Avanzo’s individualized notice requirement, adequate notice must 
not shift the burden onto to applicants to decipher DHS’s notices.  
Consider the following example of a conclusory notice, which re-
quires the applicant to take supplemental action: 
[You] are not eligible for RI Medical Assistance [because 
you] are not “aged, or blind, or permanently disabled (RI 
DHS Manual, Sections 0306.05.05 (aged), 0306.05.10 
(blind), 0306.05.15 (permanently disabled)). 
This notice fails the Avanzo individualized notice requirement be-
cause it does not relate the eligibility standard to the applicant.  
Additionally, this notice is incomplete.  In order to contest this de-
cision, the applicant must contact DHS for the cited eligibility 
standards and the specific disqualifying factual information from 
the applicant’s medical records.  As the court in Flynn noted “mere 
citation” to a regulation is insufficient.83  Furthermore, as illus-
trated in Flynn, notice is inadequate when it shifts the burden to 
the applicant to obtain more information.84 
In sum, the lack of sufficient detail in DHS’s conclusory notic-
es render the notices facially inadequate.  Statements such as you 
are ineligible “due to failure of verification” embody the broad-
 
 81.  Id. at *6. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id.  Other jurisdictions have also rejected the idea that otherwise in-
adequate notice can be remedied by having applicants/recipients proactively 
seek more information regarding the reasons for benefit terminations or inel-
igibility.  See, e.g., Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 126 (2d Cir. 2005); Vargas, 
508 F.2d at 489; Ortiz v. Eichler, 616 F. Supp. 1046, 1062 (D. Del. 1985); 
Schroeder v. Hegstrom, 590 F. Supp, 121, 128 (D. Or. 1984). 
 84.  Flynn, 1995 WL 941389, at *6; see also Baker v. Alaska Dep’t of 
Health & Soc. Servs., 191 P.3d 1005, 1010 (Alaska 2008). 
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based conclusory statements specifically prohibited in Avanzo.85  
Imagine the difficulty aged, blind, and disabled applicants encoun-
ter upon receiving such a notice. DHS’s conclusory notices only 
lead to more questions.  Thus, Rhode Island Medicaid applicants 
are unable to adequately prepare for a hearing to contest DHS’s 
ineligibility determination, and the risk of erroneous deprivation 
of benefits increases. 
2.  Notices with Financial Calculations but No Itemizations 
Another consideration in analyzing the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation is the factual and mathematical accuracy of DHS’s ineli-
gibility notices.  Accuracy is of particular importance in notices 
containing financial calculations.  Although notices are computer-
generated, DHS employees are still required to input applicants’ 
personal and financial information.  Human errors, such as trans-
posing the numbers of an applicant’s bank account balance or 
monthly income figures, can make an otherwise eligible applicant 
ineligible.  Consider the following calculation notice sent to a 
Rhode Island Medicaid applicant: 
The following individual(s) is(are) not eligible for the 
Medicare Premium Payment Program (QMB, SLMB, QI-
1): 
[Redacted] income of $[redacted] exceeds the qualified 
standard of $[redacted] as of June 05, 2015 (RI DHS 
Manual, Section 0372.05). 
The applicant, in this case, cannot test the notice’s factual or 
mathematical accuracy.  This notice does not provide any itemiza-
tion of the figures DHS used to calculate the applicant’s income.  
Further, this notice does not explain DHS’s formula or any of the 
“underlying facts upon which the calculations were based.”86  The 
applicant may disagree with the income figure; however, without 
an itemized breakdown of the figures and underlying facts used in 
the calculation, the applicant cannot determine if DHS made a 
mistake.  Moreover, this notice contains undefined technical ter-
minology, such as “QMB,” “SLMB,” and “QI-1.”  Without further 
explanation, as discussed in subsection three, these terms make 
 
 85.  Avanzo v. R.I. Dep’t of Human Servs., 625 A.2d 208, 211 (R.I. 1993). 
 86.  Ford v. Shalala, 87 F. Supp. 2d 163, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).  
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the notice very difficult to understand, and, in order to test its ac-
curacy, an applicant must have a complete understanding of the 
notice and any calculations contained within it. 
Neither Rhode Island nor the First Circuit or Federal District 
Court for the District of Rhode Island has specifically ruled on the 
legal requirements for notices involving financial calculations 
without sufficient itemization.  Other circuits and districts, 
though, have addressed the deficiencies of these notices.  In a 
string of cases, decided shortly after Goldberg, the Seventh Circuit 
held that due process required notices must contain sufficient de-
tail for an applicant or recipient to determine the factual and 
mathematical accuracy of the government agency’s determina-
tion.87  In Vargas v. Trainor, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged: 
[T]here is a human tendency, even among those who are 
more experienced and knowledgeable in the ways of bu-
reaucracies than the aged, blind, and disabled persons be-
fore us in this case, to assume that an action taken by a 
government agency in a pecuniary transaction is correct.  
Unless the welfare recipients are told why their benefits 
are being reduced or terminated, many of the mistakes 
that will inevitably be made will stand uncorrected, and 
many recipients will be unjustly deprived of the means to 
obtain the necessities of life.88 
The Seventh Circuit recognized that due process may require no-
tices involving financial calculations to include “a breakdown of 
income and deductions.”89 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York adopted the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Ford v. 
Shalala.90  In Ford, where the adequacy of the Social Security 
Administration’s notices to recipients [of disability benefits] was 
at issue, the court found that: 
When the calculations are critical to the determination of 
eligibility or benefit amount, written notice must explain 
 
 87.  Dilda v. Quern, 612 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1980); Banks v. Trai-
nor, 525 F.2d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 1975); Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 490 
(7th Cir. 1974). 
 88.  508 F.2d at 490. 
 89.  See Dilda, 612 F.2d at 1057; Banks, 525 F.2d at 842. 
 90.  87 F. Supp. 2d at 178. 
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the formula by which the benefit amount was calculated, 
identify the underlying facts upon which the calculations 
were based, and include a breakdown of the sums at-
tributable to each factor in the equation.91 
The inability of applicants to test the factual and mathematical 
accuracy of notices significantly increases the risk of erroneous 
deprivation. Because Medicaid is a means-tested program, “calcu-
lations are critical to [DHS’s] determination of eligibility.”92  
Without sufficient explanation of DHS’s formula or detailed in-
formation about the itemizations and underlying facts, some ap-
plicants may never recognize factual or mathematical errors that 
were critical in DHS’s decision to deny their eligibility for Medi-
caid. 
Summarily, such DHS notices—with financial calculations 
but no itemizations—are constitutionally inadequate because the 
notices lack sufficient detail to protect against mistakes and arbi-
trary agency action. As the court in Vargas noted, there is a ten-
dency to assume actions by a government agency are correct with-
out further investigation.93  Detailed itemizations provide a 
necessary safeguard for elderly or disabled applicants who be-
cause of their capacities and circumstances may not question 
DHS’s decision.94  Furthermore, Medicaid eligibility depends on 
whether an applicant’s income and resources meet strict require-
ments.95  Without sufficient explanation or itemization of all the 
figures used in DHS’s calculations, seemingly insignificant errors 
can leave an applicant ineligible.  Therefore, in the absence of suf-
ficient detail in these notices to test the factual and mathematical 
accuracy of DHS’s calculations, the risk of erroneous deprivation 
of benefits increases. 
3.  Incomprehensible Notices 
The last category of problematic notice encompasses a broad 
spectrum of DHS’s Medicaid ineligibility notices.  At the farthest 
extreme of the incomprehensibility spectrum, incomprehensible 
 
 91.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1974). 
 94.  See id. 
 95.  See Ford, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 186. 
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notice is best described as notice that is “so cryptic, and the infor-
mation it contains so unhelpful, that it is virtually impossible ef-
fectively to gather documentary evidence” to contest DHS’s ad-
verse determination.96  On the more moderate end of the 
incomprehensibility spectrum is notice that is difficult for the av-
erage Rhode Island Medicaid applicant to understand. 
The most readily apparent example of incomprehensibility in 
the FOIA sample were notices that did not provide any definitions 
for or explanations of technical language.  Terms like “MA house-
hold,” “flexible test of income,” and “income disregard” appear 
throughout these notices without any further elucidation.  Tech-
nical language such as “flexible test of income” presupposes a level 
of legal sophistication and familiarity with a complex government 
program that most individuals do not possess.  An additional ex-
ample of defective notice in this category would include notices 
with spelling and grammar errors that change the meaning of the 
notice. 
Clarity is an essential component of notices that are “reason-
ably calculated” to “actually inform[].”97  Furthermore, effective 
notices are “concise,” “well-organized,” and tailored to recipients’ 
reading skill levels and familiarity with the subject matter of the 
notice.98  Recently, the Ninth Circuit in Nozzi v. Housing Authori-
ty of the City of Los Angeles held that notice advising section 8 
housing beneficiaries of a reduction in their rent subsidies was 
constitutionally inadequate on its face because it did not “reason-
ably inform its intended recipients of the [subsidy reductions], the 
meaning of those changes, or, most important, their effect upon 
the recipient.”99  The Ninth Circuit found that the language of the 
notice, which “essentially mirrored the language” of the regula-
tion, was “incomprehensible to anyone without a relatively sophis-
ticated understanding of the . . . Program’s payment calcula-
 
 96.  See Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 97.   Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 
(1950).  
 98.   See Ellen E. Hoffman, Getting to “Plain Language”, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 47, 49 (2009); Cass Sunstein, Exec. Office of the Presi-
dent, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: 
Final Guidance on Implementing the Plain Writing Act of 2010 (April 13, 
2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/ 
m11-15.pdf.  
 99.  806 F.3d 1178, 1194 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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tions.”100  The notice “used the term ‘payment standards’ six times 
without ever defining or explaining the term’s meaning.”101  The 
court noted that “[a] short and simple explanation . . . would have 
provided at least a small measure of clarity.”102  DHS’s use of 
technical terminology in its ineligibility notices without a clear 
explanation of the language’s meaning does not consider the “ca-
pacities and circumstances” of the average Medicaid applicant.103  
Thereby, decreasing the likelihood the ineligibility notice will ac-
tually inform an applicant of DHS’s reasons for its ineligibility de-
termination. 
In sum, DHS’s incomprehensible notices are constitutionally 
inadequate because the notices are not “reasonably calculated” to 
“actually inform” applicants of the reasons for their Medicaid inel-
igibility.104  By not defining technical language, DHS has not in-
dividually “tailored” its notices to the “capacities and circumstanc-
es” of the average Rhode Island Medicaid applicant.105  An 
applicant’s understanding of DHS’s notice directly correlates to 
her overall ability to meaningfully contest her Medicaid ineligibil-
ity.  To appeal an adverse eligibility determination based on the 
size of an “MA household,” an applicant must know the definition 
of an “MA household.”  As the court in Nozzi concluded, a “short 
and simple explanation” is all that is needed to provide a “small 
measure of clarity.”106  This category of problematic notice is 
broad, and the risk of erroneous deprivation to Medicaid appli-
cants varies depending on which end of the incomprehensibility 
spectrum an ineligibility notice falls.  Overall, though, if a notice 
is on the spectrum it increases the risk DHS will wrongly deny an 
otherwise eligible Medicaid applicant benefits. 
C.  The Government’s Interest 
The third Mathews inquiry centers on the administrative and 
fiscal burdens on DHS to provide improved notice.107  Cost and 
 
 100.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970). 
 104.  See Nozzi, 806 F.3d at 1194 (emphasis added). 
 105.  See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268–69. 
 106.  Nozzi, 806 F.3d at 1194. 
 107.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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scarce resources “place limits on the scope of due process notice re-
lief.”108  The cost of some procedures cannot be justified.  Howev-
er, “[w]here the recipient has a ‘brutal need’ for the benefit at is-
sue, as in the case of welfare recipients, courts have traditionally 
required that agencies go to greater lengths—incurring higher 
costs and accepting inconveniences—to reduce the risk of er-
ror.”109  Certainly, the private interest at stake—vital medical 
care to low-income children, elders, and the disabled—justifies 
any additional, negligible expenditures by DHS.  It is difficult to 
conclude “that printing six paragraphs of information is any more 
burdensome than printing only four paragraphs of infor-
mation.”110 
Accordingly, the three categories of DHS’s deficient notice vio-
late core principles of due process.  While not all of DHS’s ineligi-
bility notices violate legal requirements, these notice examples 
demonstrate significant procedural deficiencies in DHS’s eligibil-
ity determination process.  In balancing the respective interests, 
the administrative and fiscal burdens to DHS are not outweighed 
by the substantial private interest and increased risk of erroneous 
deprivation to Rhode Island Medicaid applicants.  Rather negligi-
ble improvements to DHS’s notices would greatly diminish the 
risk that otherwise eligible Medicaid applicants are wrongly de-
nied benefits.  The public interest in conserving scarce adminis-
trative and fiscal resources does not override individuals’ interest 
in essential, life-saving medical care.  The Mathews test weighs in 
favor of improved notice. 
CLOSING REMARKS 
DHS’s problematic ineligibility notices illustrate severe defi-
ciencies in the agency’s administrative procedures. Compliance 
with basic due process principles demands that DHS improve 
these deficient categories of ineligibility notices.  Moreover, Rhode 
Island’s children, elders, and disabled residents deserve fair and 
reliable administrative procedures, especially because of their rel-
 
 108.  Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 124 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 109.  Baker v. Alaska Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 191 P.3d 1005, 1010 
(Alaska 2008) (footnote omitted) (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261).  Gold-
berg established that “governmental interests are not overriding in the wel-
fare context.”  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266. 
 110.  Henry v. Gross, 803 F.2d 757, 768 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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ative disadvantage to the government agency with whom they are 
dealing.  As the court in Gray Panthers articulated: 
We do not believe it unwarranted to recognize that hu-
man nature frequently leads to careless and arbitrary ac-
tion when the decisionmaker can retreat behind a screen 
of paper and anonymity.  The principle that those who 
govern must be accountable to those whose lives they af-
fect in forms not only our representative system of gov-
ernment, but on a broader scale, forms the very essence of 
what we expect from the Government it its dealing with 
us.111 
The purpose of the Medicaid program is to provide services 
and supports to help Rhode Islanders live safe and healthy lives.  
Improved ineligibility notices ensure the integrity of this mission 
by reducing the risk eligible applicants will be wrongly denied the 
benefits to which they are legally entitled.  A class action lawsuit 
may be necessary to implement the needed reforms.  Whether 
DHS acts independently or its hand is forced by a lawsuit, these 
problematic notices must change.  If not for the benefit of Medi-
caid applicants, then for the interest of conserving limited public 
resources. The additional burden to DHS to provide applicants 
with adequate notice would be negligible and may even save the 
agency money by avoiding the unnecessary expense of administra-
tive fair hearings and lawsuits stemming from defective notice.  
DHS can and must fix this problem. 
 
 
 111.  Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
